Manchester Arena Terrorist Attack 2017
United Kingdom
Integrated Summary
Manchester Arena Inquiry Reports
This summary has been compiled directly from the findings, conclusions and recommendations contained within the Manchester Arena Inquiry reports: Volume 1: Security for the Arena (2021), Volume 2: Emergency Response (2022) and Volume 3: Radicalisation and Preventability (2023).
We summarise main points presented by The Hon Sir John Saunders and his Inquiry team and is intended to provide a succinct integrated summary of all three Volumes for professional learning and protective security & counter terrorism system improvements particularly for the private sector.
This summary uses approximately 1500 words to identify and deliver key points from the reports. The author of this summary has added some comments in red next to some of the lessons learned points.
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Introduction
The Manchester Arena Inquiry, chaired by The Hon Sir John Saunders, was launched to examine the circumstances surrounding the terrorist bombing at Manchester Arena on 22 May 2017, during an Ariana Grande concert. The bombing, carried out by Salman Abedi (SA), was the deadliest terrorist attack in the UK since the 7/7 bombings in 2005.
- Volume 1 focused on the security arrangements at the venue, highlighting missed opportunities and failings by SMG (the operator), Showsec (the security contractor), and British Transport Police (BTP).
- Volume 2 analysed the emergency response, scrutinising the effectiveness and readiness of Greater Manchester Police (GMP), Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS), North West Ambulance Service (NWAS), and other responders. It detailed how the response was compromised by poor communication, lack of coordination, and inadequate preparedness.
- Volume 3 addressed the radicalisation process, planning, and whether the attack could have been prevented, examining the actions of the Security Service (MI5) and Counter Terrorism Policing.
Collectively, the Inquiry’s purpose was to hold organisations accountable, to provide answers to the bereaved, and to shape robust measures to prevent similar atrocities.
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Casualties
Twenty-two innocent people lost their lives; they were children, teenagers, parents, and friends who had gathered to celebrate music. Hundreds more suffered severe physical injuries and enduring psychological trauma. Their names, as memorialised across all three volumes, are central to the Inquiry’s work.
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Timeline
22 May 2017
Evening. Over 14,000 people attended the Ariana Grande concert.
20:30–22:30. SA carried out hostile reconnaissance, exploiting CCTV blind spots and security gaps.
22:31. SA detonated the device in the City Room as crowds were exiting. Twenty-two were killed instantly or died soon after from catastrophic injuries. Hundreds were injured:
- Post-Attack. The emergency response was immediate in parts but marred by severe delays, miscommunication, and a lack of joint command structure.
- Investigations. The public inquiry was formally established in October 2019. Reports were published progressively: Volume 1 in June 2021, Volume 2 in November 2022, and Volume 3 in March 2023.
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Investigating Bodies
- Chair. The Hon Sir John Saunders, appointed as Coroner and Inquiry Chair.
- Volumes Produced By. Manchester Arena Inquiry Team under statutory powers of the Inquiries Act 2005.
- Oversight. Assisted by Counsel to the Inquiry, survivors, bereaved families, security experts, and the wider public through hearings.
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Attacker Planning Before the Attack
Volume 3 detailed SA’s radicalisation trajectory, influenced heavily by his family’s connections to violent extremism, travel to Libya for military training, and exposure to ISIS ideology. Despite being known to the Security Service, SA’s threat level was downgraded before his final travel back to the UK.
From 2010 to 2017, there were multiple missed opportunities:
- Intelligence identified him as a subject of interest but he was not under active investigation.
- Indicators of extremist behaviour were overlooked by schools, mosques, and Prevent partners.
- He travelled to Libya and returned with clear indicators of militant preparation, including communication with known extremists.
In the days before the attack, SA procured and assembled bomb components in rented premises, made test detonations, and conducted reconnaissance of the Arena’s vulnerabilities.
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Actions Taken by the Attacker
On the night, SA:
- Arrived at the Victoria Exchange Complex at 20:30.
- Moved repeatedly in and out of the City Room, exploiting known CCTV blind spots and weak security patrols.
- Remained undetected by security and police despite suspicious behaviour flagged by members of the public.
- At 22:31, detonated his device among families collecting children, causing mass casualties in seconds.
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Visitor & Staff Actions During the Attack
Accounts from Volume 1 and 2 show that:
- Some security staff noted his suspicious behaviour but lacked the confidence, experience, or supervision to act decisively.
- One member of the public raised concerns about SA to a security supervisor, but the follow-up was inadequate.
- Once the explosion occurred, concertgoers, venue staff, and off-duty police officers provided immediate first aid.
- Members of the public used makeshift stretchers and improvised lifesaving efforts in the chaos.
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Preplanned Security Measures at the Facility
The Inquiry found the Arena’s security framework was fundamentally flawed:
- Risk assessments by SMG and Showsec failed to adequately address the credible threat of terrorism, despite the high threat level.
- The perimeter security and bag checks were inconsistent; the City Room, a prime gathering point, was poorly protected.
- CCTV blind spots, including the mezzanine, provided the attacker with a place to hide in plain sight.
- The reliance on part-time, inadequately trained security staff and limited counter terrorism expertise severely undermined threat detection.
- The British Transport Police, responsible for policing the area, did not maintain a visible, deterrent presence throughout.
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Security Staff Actions Before and During the Attack
The Inquiry’s Volume 1 conclusions were stark:
- Missed opportunities by Showsec staff and BTP patrols were directly linked to the failure to disrupt SA.
- A lack of clear command, supervision, and communication meant staff were ill-equipped to handle potential threats.
- There was an over-reliance on generic industry practice rather than tailored counter terrorism security measures.
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Emergency Response Effectiveness
Volume 2 revealed significant failures:
- There was no coordinated command structure in the early critical minutes.
- Greater Manchester Police did not activate their Major Incident Plan correctly; GM Fire & Rescue Service failed to attend the scene promptly due to confusion over rendezvous points.
- North West Ambulance Service deployed paramedics but did not send enough into the blast area; the use of stretchers was inadequate.
- The Care Gap the period between the incident and effective medical intervention was widened due to these failures.
Despite these systemic problems, individual acts of heroism by first responders, arena staff, and bystanders undoubtedly saved lives.
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Lessons Learned and Recommendations
Across the three volumes, the Inquiry’s key recommendations included:
- Implementation of a statutory Protect Duty to ensure venues assess and mitigate terrorist threats proportionately.
- Improved training and accreditation for security staff, including behavioural detection. Comment: This goal is unlikely to be achieved while SIA courses remain accepted as the default standard. Meaningful progress will require significant reform in the SIA’s leadership; at present, it is a case of the blind leading the blind.
- Enhancements to CCTV systems to eliminate blind spots. Comment: As long as the SIA CCTV Operator licence is seen as the standard of excellence, eliminating blind spots will have limited value. Most operators still lack training in situational awareness and behavioural detection, and we are eight years on from the attack. The reality is that the SIA badge remains the default benchmark, despite these critical gaps.
- Strengthened multi-agency emergency preparedness with clear command structures and joint exercises. Comment: This will remain limited in impact until the problem of theory blindness within the emergency services is addressed and groupthink is actively challenged. Without tackling these issues, the same ineffective systems used during past incidents will persist in future responses.
- Reforms to MI5 and Counter Terrorism Policing to improve handling of low-level threats, review processes, and information sharing.
- Better integration of the Prevent strategy within communities, educational institutions, and local policing. Comment: Serious failings with the Prevent Strategy continue to emerge in connection with recent attacks. It is clear that lessons have not been fully learned, even eight years after the Arena Attack.
Comment: For more than two decades, the SIA’s focus on volume over quality and competence has seriously undermined the capability and professionalism of UK security staff. It is often described as a badging factory for good reason, producing an oversupply of low-value, poorly skilled personnel instead of raising industry standards.
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Conclusion
The Manchester Arena bombing exposed a devastating confluence of missed opportunities, systemic failings, and gaps in security culture that, had they been addressed, could have saved lives or reduced harm.
The Inquiry provides painful but vital lessons for venues, security providers, local authorities, and national counter terrorism bodies. Above all, the memory of the twenty-two who lost their lives demands that these lessons be acted upon with urgency and diligence.
Through the dedication of the families, survivors, and professionals who contributed to these volumes, this tragedy must become a catalyst for change, ensuring no community ever again endures such preventable horror.
References
Manchester Arena Inquiry (2021) Volume 1: Security for the Arena. Report of the Public Inquiry into the Attack on Manchester Arena on 22nd May 2017. Chairman: The Hon Sir John Saunders. Presented to Parliament pursuant to section 26 of the Inquiries Act 2005.
Manchester Arena Inquiry (2022) Volume 2: Emergency Response. Report of the Public Inquiry into the Attack on Manchester Arena on 22nd May 2017. Chairman: The Hon Sir John Saunders. Presented to Parliament pursuant to section 26 of the Inquiries Act 2005.
Manchester Arena Inquiry (2023) Volume 3: Radicalisation and Preventability. Report of the Public Inquiry into the Attack on Manchester Arena on 22nd May 2017. Chairman: The Hon Sir John Saunders. Presented to Parliament pursuant to section 26 of the Inquiries Act 2005.
Copyright & Source Statement
This report summary is an independent assessment compiled using material from the Manchester Arena Inquiry reports: Volume 1 (Security for the Arena), Volume 2 (Emergency Response), and Volume 3 (Radicalisation and Preventability), chaired by The Hon Sir John Saunders. The original reports are © Crown copyright and licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
The text has been adapted for succinctness and clarity.
You are free to use this content under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, visit: www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3.
Source: Manchester Arena Inquiry Reports (2021–2023), available at www.manchesterarenainquiry.org.uk
Any errors of interpretation are the responsibility of the publisher.
Summary Author: Anthony Gledhill. A seasoned security professional with decades of practical insight.
Useful Links:
Protective Security & Counter Terrorism Consultancy – 21st Century Security Management Solutions