Pulse Nightclub Terrorist Attack 2016
USA
Report Summary
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Whats it about?
This summary has been compiled directly from the Rescue, Response, and Resilience report conducted by a team of experts assembled by the US Police Foundation in consultation with the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office). The lead authors included Frank Straub, Jack Cambria, Jane Castor, Ben Gorban, Brett Meade, David Waltemeyer, and Jennifer Zeunik.
The review was commissioned by Orlando Police Chief John W. Mina following the Pulse Nightclub terrorist attack that occurred on June 12, 2016. The assessment team’s main work was carried out between January and April 2017, and the report was published later that year.
The review aimed to identify best practices, lessons learned, and areas for improvement in planning, training, policies, and interagency coordination for mass casualty events. Delivered by the Police Foundation’s expert team, the findings were based on extensive interviews, focus groups, policy and data reviews, and analysis of incident timelines.
The final report offered practical recommendations to strengthen future preparedness and response and contains approximately 90,000 words.
Summary Aim. This report summary uses approximately 1500 words to succinctly deliver some critical information for professional learning, protective security and counter terrorism particularly for the private sector.
The summary author has added some comments in Red next to some key points from the report findings to highlight some areas for European Countries protective security and counter terrorism systems.
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Introduction
On June 12, 2016, a lone attacker, Omar Mateen, carried out a mass shooting and hostage siege at the Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, Florida. The attack left 49 dead and over 50 injured, making it the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11 at that time.
The critical incident review dissects the attacker’s planning, the actions during the attack, the behaviour of club patrons, the preparedness and response of security staff, and key lessons learned for other venues and communities.
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Timeline of Events
Pre-Attack Planning
The report indicates the attacker, Omar Mateen, had previously cased the Pulse nightclub before June 12, 2016. Exact dates for reconnaissance are not specified but occurred in the days/weeks leading up to the attack.
Mateen rented a car for the attack. The rental date isn’t specified but was clearly before the evening of June 11, 2016.
Day of the Attack – Sunday, June 12, 2016
Before 2:00 a.m. Mateen parked his rented vehicle at Pro Tint & Detailing, next to Pulse nightclub, and approached on foot.
2:02 a.m. The attacker entered Pulse nightclub armed with a Sig Sauer MCX .223 rifle and a Glock 17 handgun. He immediately began firing at patrons inside.
2:02:17 a.m. An Orlando Police Department (OPD) detective working extra duty at the club radioed Shots fired, shots fired and requested assistance.
2:03–2:05 a.m. OPD officers arrived on scene within 1–2 minutes of the alert.
2:06–2:15 a.m. Officers formed contact teams, engaged the suspect, and began rescuing patrons. The situation transitioned from an active shooter to a barricaded hostage situation.
2:30–5:15 a.m. Negotiations and tactical operations continued. SWAT breached walls to rescue hostages.
5:15 a.m. The suspect was killed by law enforcement in an exchange of gunfire.
11:15 a.m. The scene, including the suspect’s vehicle, was officially cleared of explosive threats.
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Attacker Planning Before the Attack
The attacker conducted prior reconnaissance, having visited Pulse on at least one occasion before the attack. He parked a rented vehicle nearby, ensuring quick access. He chose the target for maximum casualties among a vulnerable community.
Mateen entered with a military-style Sig Sauer MCX .223-caliber rifle and a Glock 17 handgun, showing clear intent to inflict mass harm. Notably, he was familiar with the club’s layout, which allowed him to choose entry points and target crowded areas during last call when the venue was at capacity.
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Actions Taken by the Attacker During the Attack
The shooting began at approximately 2:00 a.m. The attacker immediately fired on patrons near the entrance, moving rapidly inside to the dance floor and adjoining rooms. He continued firing indiscriminately, moving into restrooms and trapping dozens inside.
The attack evolved into three phases. Comment: This is what’s called Intruderology information. Critical for Red Teaming as its more commonly known in the UK.
- Phase I. Active Shooting (2:00–2:15 a.m.). The attacker moved room to room, causing chaos and casualties.
- Phase 2. Barricaded Hostage Situation (2:15–4:45 a.m.). Mateen took hostages in the club’s restrooms, threatening them and negotiating with police, claiming to have explosives.
- Phase 3. Resolution (4:45–5:15 a.m.). A police SWAT team breached a wall using an explosive charge and an armoured vehicle, engaging Mateen and fatally shooting him.
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Customers’ Actions to Survive
Patrons displayed remarkable survival instincts despite the shock and chaos. Many escaped through multiple exits, including the main entrance, the patio, and even a hole kicked into a fence by a security guard, which allowed around 20 people to flee. Some patrons hid behind bars, in storage closets, or restrooms.
Text messages and calls for help were made, alerting family and law enforcement to their locations. A few injured patrons played dead to avoid detection. Hostages coordinated quiet communication with police via text. Their actions saved lives and aided responders in identifying where victims were hiding.
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Pre-Planned Security Measures at the Club
Pulse employed off-duty Orlando Police Department (OPD) officers for extra security, in addition to its own private security personnel. These pre-planned measures proved critical. The off-duty OPD detective are able to immediately call for backup, engage suspects, and relay crucial information.
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Security Staff Actions Before and During the Attack
The off-duty OPD officer on security detail quickly recognised the scale of the threat, returned fire, and broadcasted an urgent call for assistance, initiating a rapid multi-agency response. Private security staff inside helped guide patrons toward exits and physically broke through barriers when standard exits became impassable.
Their split-second decisions contributed to the survival of many. Comment: The off-duty police undoubtedly proved to be an excellent policy for the club security. Without that asset, the attack would have been more deadly and many more lives lost.
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Lessons Learned and Recommendations for Other Venues
Preattack Measures
- Conduct regular vulnerability assessments, focusing on exit routes, crowd flow, and the club’s physical layout.
- Train all staff in active shooter and mass casualty scenarios, including coordination with local law enforcement.
- Build strong relationships with local police and emergency services. This ensures a unified, rapid response.
- Comment: This situation is every politician and police nightmare scenario in the UK, the above three recommendations are critical, the time to realise those measures are required is not at the time of the attack. Using 21st century mitigation approaches will deliver the above recommendations in a time and cost effective manner.
During an Attack
- Maintain clear evacuation routes and ensure staff are empowered to guide patrons quickly.
- Have trained security who can identify threats early, engage if safe, and communicate with law enforcement.
- Empower patrons with information on what to do: Run, Hide, Fight principles must be communicated widely in pre-event signage or briefings where appropriate.
- Comment: Point two highlights a critical skill set, unfortunately the UK security industry is 25 years behind the curve on situational awareness and behavioural detection. A 3 or 4 day SIA course almost anybody can attend carries no value in real terms of security. There must be a fundamental shift in the UK towards a minimum 4-week SIA badging course with compulsory continuation training dates. The value of security must be lifted, the volume over competency strategy is a losing approach.
Post-Attack Support and Recovery:
- Establish crisis communication plans that address families, media, and the community. The OPD’s use of unified messaging helped control misinformation.
- Provide mental health support for survivors, families, staff, and first responders. Orlando created family assistance and victim support centres that helped with reunification and long-term recovery.
- Promote community resilience. Orlando’s community response included vigils, funds for victims, and long-term memorials, reinforcing the importance of post-incident healing and solidarity.
- Comment: All the above must be covered in the crisis management & business continuity plans. Or, a stand alone document for small to medium size organisations.
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Broader Recommendations for First Responders and Communities
The report emphasised the value of:
- Using the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS) to unify multi-agency responses. Comment: The UK has the JESIP system, which suffers from group think and theory blindness issues, resistance to change was evident after the Arena Attack in Manchester in 2017. The future will tell how these obstacles have been overcome.
- Equipping officers with medical kits and tactical equipment to manage mass casualties.
- Regular multi-agency drills that simulate mass shooting, hostage, and explosive threat scenarios.
- Ongoing training in crisis negotiations and coordinated tactical response for hostage barricade incidents.
- Promoting officer wellness and peer support to help responders deal with traumatic aftermath.
- Comment: All the above is happening within the UK emergency response services.
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Conclusion
The Pulse Nightclub attack tragically demonstrated the evolving threat posed by lone actor terrorism and mass casualty violence. The actions of the attacker were calculated and brutal, but the resilience and instinctive survival actions of patrons, the bravery of security personnel, and the determined response of law enforcement limited even greater loss of life.
Lessons learned from this event stress the vital importance of planning, partnership, training, and community resilience. Nightclubs, entertainment venues, and similar facilities must remain vigilant, continuously improve emergency procedures, and foster strong relationships with emergency services to mitigate future tragedies.
Organisations must also invest in long-term recovery (BC Plans) to ensure victims, responders, and the public have the support they need to heal and rebuild.
Summary Author: Anthony Gledhill is a seasoned security professional with decades of real-world insight.
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Reference:
Straub, F., Cambria, J., Castor, J., Gorban, B., Meade, B., Waltemeyer, D. & Zeunik, J. (2017) Rescue, Response, and Resilience: A Critical Incident Review of the Orlando Public Safety Response to the Attack on the Pulse Nightclub. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
Copyright and Source Statement
This summary contains information extracted and adapted from Rescue, Response, and Resilience: A Critical Incident Review of the Orlando Public Safety Response to the Attack on the Pulse Nightclub, published in 2017 by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office), U.S. Department of Justice, and the Police Foundation. All original material remains the copyright of the respective authors and the U.S. Department of Justice. This summary is provided for educational and informational purposes only and does not claim any rights to the original work.
Useful Links:
Protective Security & Counter Terrorism Consultancy – 21st Century Security Management Solutions